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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER
ATTEMpTS.
State v. Redmon, S. Car., 113 S. E. 467. Attempt to commit a misdemeanor
held not indictable.
It is elementary law that an attempt to commit a misdemeanor is not an
indictable offense.
Cothran and Marion, JJ., dissenting.
ARSON.
State v. Meservie, Me., 118 At. 483. "Dwelling House."
Where the dwelling house, ell, woodshed, carriage house, and barn were
connected, forming one continuous set of buildings, with passageway from
house to barn without going out of doors, a defendant who set fire to the barn
was guilty of setting fire to a "dwelling house," under Rev. St. c. 121, Sec. 8,
making it a crime to set fire to a dwelling house and defining what constitutes
a "dwelling house."
ASSAULT AND

BATTERY.

State v. Maggert, Mont., 209 Pac. 989. Joint principals.
Where two defendants in a prosecution for assault admit they confronted
plaintiff with the common purpose of accusing him of certain statements, and
one or the other of them beating him, depending upon whether he admitted or
denied the statements, each is a principal and they are not entitled to an instruction that, if each was acting individually and for separate purposes, and not
under a common design, neither can be convicted.
CONFESSION.

State v. Elwell, Ore., 209 Pac. 616. "Other proof" required for admissibility.
Under Or. L. Sec. 1537, providing that a confession is insufficient to warrant
conviction without "some other proof' that the crime has been committed," in
arson prosecution, where the state'had proved only that the building occupied by
accused as tenant had burned, and that accused and his family were in it when
it caught fire, proof offered by the state, in connection with accused's confession,
that accused was in debt, and that he carried insurance upon his stock of
merchandise and furniture in the building at the time of the fire, did not supply
the statutory requirement of "some other proof that the crime has been committed."
Burnett, C. J., and Brown and McBride, JJ., dissenting.
FORMER JEOPARDY.

Ex parte Hall, M. J., 118 Atl. 347. Waiver.
Assuming that where the defense of former jeopardy is duly raised, the
fact of the identity of the two offenses is fatal to any futher jurisdiction in
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respect of the second charge, the right of immunity from double conviction
under Const. Art. 1, Sec. 10, is a personal right, and may be waived, and when
waived does not affect the court's jurisdiction as to the'further proceedings in
the cause.
Where one charged in one indictment with embezzling $55,000, and in eight
other indictments with embezzling parts of such sum, after pleading not guilty
withdrew the plea and pleaded nolo contendere to all the indictments without
offering to so plead, either to the first indictment or to the other eight, and
without in any way raising the objection of double conviction, he waived the
objection, especially where sentence under the last eight indictments was not
imposed at the same time as sentence under the first indictment, and during the
interval defendant made no attempt to withdraw his plea and plead a former
conviction.
HoMIIDE.

Giddens v. State, Ga., 113 S. E. 386. Killing officer to prevent illegal arrest.
"To slay an officer who is without authority of law to make an arrest for a
misdemeanor, where the motive of the slayer is merely to avoid an illegal arrest,
would be manslaughter." Under the evidence in the case, the defendant is guilty
of manslaughter, if guilty of anything.
Under the evidence in this case, the verdict of the jury finding the defendant
guilty of murder is contrary to law and contrary to the evidence, and the court
erred in refusing a new trial.
HomicmD.

McAndrews v. People, Colo., 208 Pac. 486. Malice.
Where death results from an attack made with hands and feet only on a
person of mature years and in full health and strength, the law will not imply
malice, because odinarily death would not result therefrom.
Burk and Denison, JJ., dissenting. Burke, J., said in part:
"From the undisputed testimony in this case it is perfectly apparent that the
death of Keim was directly and solely due to a fractured skull caused by a blow
delivered by defendant, and no reasonable man sitting as a juror in this case
could, in my opinion, by any possibility, reach any other conclusion, or have a
shadow of a doubt about that one ...
"It is said that malice may never be implied from the use of the bare fists.
But malice is not an implication of law, but one of fact, and facts are implied by
the jury, not by the court. ...
"The majority opinion seems to me a sign-board to those who seek to take
human life, pointing out to them the means which may be used by one who
would be immune from the penalty which the law fixes for murder. It is a
warning to those who would fearlessly do their part to put a stop to that reckless
driving of automobiles which leaves wrecked vehicles and maimed and lifeless
bodies in its wake, that they take their own lives in their hands when they
interfere. It is another stone in the wall of unsound precedent behind which
criminals seek to barricade themselves in their war upon society. We should be
diligent in tearing down that barrier, not in strengthening it. The judgment
should be affirmed."

594

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Dobbins v. State, .Okla., 208 Pac. 1056. M11arriage under duress as a defense
to charge of wife abandonment.
Where there had been no effort to annul the marriage, the fact that the
husband married his wife under duress is no valid defense to a charge of wife
abandonment.
INDICTMENT.

State v. Brumfield; Ore., 209 Pac. 120.
Refusal to quash indictment on the ground that an attorney who was a
resident of another county was permitted to be in the grand jury room, and to
examine witnesses, in violation of Or. L. Sec. 1424, prohibiting the presence of
persons other than the district attorney and witnesses actually under examination,
held proper where such attorney had been regularly appointed and sworn as a
deputy prosecuting attorney for the county, since he was a de facto officer, even
if a resident of other county.
INSANITY.

State v. White, Kans., 209 Pac. 660. Test of.
Charged with assaulting her former husband with intent to commit a felony,
the defendant interposed the defense of insanity. In substance the court charged
that the test of her responsibility was whether at the time of the act she was
capable of understanding what she was doing and had the power to know that
her act was wrong. Held, following State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205, 4 Pac. 159, and
State v. Mowry, 37 Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 282, and authorities cited therein, that the
instruction was proper, and further held, that the court properly refused to
.instruct that if the defendant knew the act to be wrong, but was driven to it by
an irrestible impulse arising from an insane delusion, she would not be responsible.
JURY.

People v. Wismer, Calif. D. C. A., 209 Pac. 259. "Impartial Juror."
Under Pen. Code, Sec. 1076, a juror, who, on his voir dire in a prosecution
for criminal syndicalism, stated that he had served in a similar trial previously,

and formed the opinion that the I. W. W., in which defendant was accused of
being a member; was an unlawful organization, was legally ineligible for actual
bias as defined by Sec. 1073, subd. 2, and his disqualification was not cured by
his asseverations that he would be able to accord defendant a fair and impartial
trial.
JURY.

Littrell v. State, Okla., 209 Pac. 184. "ImpartialJuror."
The words "impartial juror," as expressed in the Constitution, have no such
fixed meaning as would. preclude the Legislature from defining, in some measure,
what should constitute, an impartial juror. There was no intention to exclude
persons who read newspapers, and it was never intended that an opinion formed
from such information should necessarily disqualify such persons as a juror.
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a. The mere fact that a juror has a settled impression or opinion as to the
merits of the case, resulting from reading newspaper accounts or from current
rumor, and not obtained from personal knowledge of the facts or whom witnesses who purport to know the facts, does not necessarily render the juror
incompetent. R. L. 1910, Secs. 5858 and 5861.
b. Ordinarily, where a juror testified that he believes he can and the court
finds as a matter of fact that he would, if selected, render an impartial verdict
upon the evidence, he is an impartial juror, under our Constitution and the
statutes of this state.
MALICIOUS MIscHIEF.

Thissen v. State, Okla., 209 Pac. 224. Malice.
In a prosecution for malicious mischief under section 2765, Rev. Laws, 1910,
malice toward the owner of the property defaced, injured, or destroyed is a
necessary ingredient of the offense.
To support a conviction for malicious mischief arising out of the killing of
a dog belonging to another, the state need not show actual or express malice
toward the owner of such dog, but it must establish such a, degree of malice
against the owner which the law deems sufficient to be inferred from the nature
of the act itself and from the circumstances which accompany and characterize it.
TRIAL.

Vest v. State, Ariz., 208 Pac. 412. Failure to submit form of verdict for
acquittal on ground of insanity.
Where the court instructed the jury that if they found defendant insane-they
should return a verdict of not guilty, and submitted, among other forms for
verdict, a form of verdict simply finding defendant not guilty, his failure
to submit a form finding defendant not guilty on the ground of insanity
was not prejudicial to accused, since the reason for requiring such verdict
is that the court may take further steps to restrain and confine defendafit,
as provided in Pen. Code 1913, Sec. 1100, so that it is not for the benefit of
accused, and it cannot be supposed that if the jury had found him to be insane
they would have refused to return a verdict of not guilty under the instructions
because of the failure to submit the other form.
VERDICT.

State v. Turco., N. J., 118 Atl. 579.
Upon the trial of an indictment charging that the defendant did willfully,
feloniously, and of his malice aforethought kill and murder the deceased, our
statute (P. L. 1917, p. 801, Sec. 107) requiring the jury, if they find any person
guilty of murder, to "designate by their verdict whether it be murder in the
first degree or in the second degree," is imperative, and no judgment can be
rendered upon a verdict of "guilty" which does not designate the degree. And
if the jury be discharged and judgment pronounced without the insufficient
verdict being amended by the jury by adding the intended degree, the judgment
will be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

